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Inthis paper I want to discuss the idea of the creative industries and the new agenda it has set for many national and local governments in Europe, North America and increasingly in 
Asia. I want to explore its possible relationship to the activities of the Multi Functional Exhibition 
Hall (MFEH); but in so doing I want to challenge some of its interpretations and suggest that in 
this challenge lies the possibility of a unique role for the MFEH and Gwangju in general. 
The term “creative industries” was invented in 1998 by the new minister Chris Smith who 
needed to convince the Economics Department that it should give more money to his new 
Department of Culture Media and Sport (DCMS). The word “culture” sounded like “art” and that 
was not going to convince the economists that it was crucial to the future of the UK. So they 
quickly renamed the “cultural industries” as the “creative industries.” In some ways then, the 
origin of “creative industries” lies in purely pragmatic policy and politics.
But like all these things a pragmatic move reflects wider shifts in attitudes and understandings. 
In speaking of the history of CIs today I want to give four stories, four narratives of where the 
idea comes from and what is at stake. These stories are very important for the thinking around 
the MFEH in Gwangju.
Story One: Re-thinking the Cultural Industries 
The first relates to those very “cultural industries” which were so hastily renamed in 1998. The 
renaming was controversial. I had been involved in cultural industries policies for 10 years, and I 
was not alone in thinking that the shift to creative industries was somehow wrong or incoherent. I 
will return to this.
From the perspective of “cultural industries” the ideas associated with “creative industries” in 
fact have a long history. It is usual to begin with Adorno, who invented the term and with whom 
it was long associated. He came at the end of a long tradition of aesthetic theory, going back to 
the 18th century, but now colored by avant-garde modernism, Marxism and the catastrophe of 
Fascism. 
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e I don’t want to go into this in detail. Just to say he has been over simplified―reduced to a 
defender of “high culture” against “mass” or “popular” culture. He is more than this. When he 
talked about Hollywood, US TV, Radio and Pop music, he was not so much talking about the 
commercialization of culture but its industrialization―it being subject to a machine-like production 
process. What became known as “Fordism.” Its products were standardized repetitions of “effects” 
that encouraged its audience to respond like machines to these effects. It was the endless 
repetition of the same. The purpose, in this “mass society,” was to keep the workers happy and 
relaxed so they could go to work the next day.
In the late 1960s these ideas were picked up again, but subjected to more serious scrutiny. 
By that time the culture industry―TV, Radio, Film, recorded music, newspapers and publishing, 
advertising, and so on―were of much greater importance economically but also culturally. It was 
impossible to ignore them or their effects. What these effects were was debated. For many they 
were about American (or Japanese) mass culture; they undermined the identity of the nation; 
they were imperialist etc. For many others, popular culture was a source of new energies and 
social change. 
However they were interpreted (and we will return to this) they gave rise to academic 
investigation as to how exactly they worked. Many working with “political economy,” often 
Marxist in inspiration, suggested that Adorno had got it wrong.
1) That these were not “ideological” industries aimed at keeping the workers happy; they were 
themselves commodities and needed (at least in market economies) to make money to survive.
2) That they therefore had to appeal to what people wanted―they had to have a “use value” 
for the audience. This included novelty not repetition but also a certain sense of meaning or even 
“authenticity.”
3) That each different branch had a different way of monetizing its products: Physical products 
(Records/CD); or control of access (Film; live performance) or free/cheap linked to advertising 
revenue (TV; Newspapers). All these introduced different dynamics.
Therefore:
1) There was not a culture industry but cultural industries. They were not one unified sector, 
nor were they some propaganda department of the state―their need for profits often went against 
the state (censorship, new technologies of copying etc.). 
2) “Cultural value” is the basis of economic value―and this introduced a lot of uncertainty 
into the process. It was impossible to know in advance what this “cultural value” might be. The 
audiences were volatile and unpredictable. 9 out of 10 products fail―the successes subsidize 
the failures. There are ways of managing this (genres, stars, sequels, formulas, back catalogues, 
special editions, marketing) but essentially it was about “rationalizing the irrational.”
3) The reduction of the artists or “creative workers” to factory workers never happened. 
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Many remained freelancers or very small businesses; even salaried workers had a high degree 
of autonomy. Of course this could be seen as free R&D―the creatives develop ideas at their own 
expense on low incomes―or a “reserve army” where there were so many creatives wanting 
work that it kept wages down. But whatever this was it was not mass factory production. 
How one managed the volatility of consumption was one issue; but how to manage highly 
skilled, autonomous and often awkward creative input was also a major problem. Each branch 
of the cultural industries evolved all sorts of ways to manage this. They became complex and 
sophisticated “industries” or “ecosystems”; they have been faced by rapid technological and 
social change (the internet is now a major challenge) but there are also longer term continuities in 
how they adapt and evolve. 
4) The energies of popular and commercial cultures could not be ignored. Not only did most 
cultural consumption come from this sector not from public funded art, but the artistic aspirations 
and cultural creativity often surpassed these “official” arts. From the later 1970s onwards many in 
Europe, North America and Australia―mostly at the urban level―began to suggest that a modern 
democratic cultural policy could not ignore this sector. New kinds of cultural policy emerged which 
looked to develop the cultural industries for economic and social, as well as cultural reasons. 
Story Two: Creative Industries as the New Economy
Up to 1980s the cultural industries were something of an anomaly, a survival of handcraft or 
artisanal production. This was at a period when small businesses were still seen as unviable and 
that concentration into large conglomerates was the way to achieve economic modernization. 
In late 1980s early 1990s this changed. The cultural industries went from being a strange 
survival from an earlier epoch, to cutting edge industries; not a hangover from the old but a 
template for the new.
What the new creative industries argument emphasises is the productive use of artistic or 
cultural creativity, and it does so by making new connections between economy and culture. 
In short, that art and industry have been falsely divided for two long, that they are now coming 
together to produce a new kind of economy.
How are we to understand this?
New Labour defined the creative industries thus: 
“Those industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential 
for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property.”
Session 2 :  TOPIC 4 The Concept of Creative Industries and its Implications for MFEH
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e There were a number of criticisms of this. For example, it stresses individual rather than 
complex “industries” or ecosystems and it emphasises intellectual property―and this is not the 
main source of income for most creative businesses (more about large corporations) nor owned 
by those who actually produce it.
But my issue here is with the idea of creativity. It becomes the central defining characteristic 
of these individuals and businesses. In fact, as a newly identified competitive input it is to be 
extended from CIs to many other parts of the economy and social life. It becomes a central driver 
of innovation, an abstract “input” into a system or a “capacity” to be developed in an individual, 
group or society.
We get books and reports and courses on creativity. Psychological―“the creative mind”; 
Neurological―left/ right brain; Anthropological―human ingenuity/ problem solving as “hard 
wired”; Educational―techniques to promote it.
But what is not creative? We find “creativity” in science, business, everyday life etc. John 
Howkins The Creative Economy includes patents, trademarks, designs, copyright―in fact 
making money from ideas covers a vast area. Richard Florida’s Creative Class includes lawyers, 
scientists, accountants, doctors, more of less anyone who is not blue collar. Where can we 
sensibly draw the boundaries? If creativity is everywhere what distinguishes artistic or “cultural” 
creativity from these other kinds? 
The idea of man as a creative being goes back at least to the renaissance and is one of the 
central philosophical and historical concerns of the last 300 years. So we need to be historically 
specific about what we mean by “creativity” otherwise it returns to the banal and the purely 
ideological.
This story in part derived from Post-Fordism. Here flexible specialisation, outsourcing, new 
forms of management and co-ordination linked to ICT contribute to a knowledge and network 
economy and society.
In this knowledge workers are essential. This has a long history: white collar workers, the rise 
of the service industries, the new middle class, Daniel Bell’s “symbol workers.” These taken over 
by Castells: his network society depends on the production and manipulation of symbols, and this 
“cultural” capacity in the educational sense.
In 1990s this became linked to the cultural industries. These reflected the new post-fordist 
industries in structure―highly networked, flexible, clusters of sub-contracting micro-businesses
―but they were cutting edge in terms of their relationship to new, fluid markets. 
The difficult business model we talked about was based, first, on volatile, unpredictable 
audiences and how to manage this and, second, around the management of creatives who could 
somehow produce for this market―who had a cultural or emotional connection which allowed 
them to anticipate it in some way. 
As Andy Pratt says―creative industries are no more creative that any other industry―by 
which he means that they don’t have a magic aura―but that their business model demands 
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constant innovation and intense relationship to existing and potential audiences/markets. In this 
they are simply leading the way for the more general evolution of post-functional market goods 
and services.
It is in this sense that the specifically productive nature of artistic labour (or at least its complex 
management and organization) comes into the foreground. This is when the “artist” becomes 
exemplar for the entrepreneur.
This can be seen in management literature. Schumpeter had defined the entrepreneur as the 
rule breaker, the one that was not driven by profit―or at least not just by profit―but by a desire 
to create new markets. He adopted Marx’s notion of “creative destruction.” This made the 
entrepreneur a heroic figure, not the conformist “organisation man” but the rebel, the radical, 
outcast. It is clear that there are many parallels with the figure of the modernist artist―the rebel, 
breaking the rules, smashing the icons, going forward into the unknown future. In management 
books from the 1980s onwards it was the rule breakers, the rebels who were the new business 
leaders and they were explicitly modelled on artists. 
It is in this sense that the artist, the creatives move closer to business, to economics and where 
they were once seen as anti-market they now seen as having the secrets to access to these new 
markets. It is for this reason we now have such interest in the creative industries.
Story Three: Post-Materialist Consumer Capitalism
But these ideas themselves are set against a much broader story. And I think it is particularly 
interesting for Asian societies and something I’m thinking about at the moment regarding China.
First, there is a growing market for cultural goods as the statistics show. The “cultural” or 
“symbolic” input into previously purely functional goods and services is a real phenomenon. Those 
industries that provide these are increasing faster than other sectors and provide employment and 
economic growth. How do we explain this?
The most basic ideas relate to rising levels of education, leisure and money. Of course; but we 
must remember that this is not some automatic or natural growth―people have to learn or be 
directed in various ways. For example, the Chinese government showing people what a “hobby” 
is―how to use leisure in a productive way―and how not to use it badly. But how “education, 
leisure and money” are change society is one central to the politics (in the largest sense, of how 
we should live together) of our time. It is by no means a singular path.
In the West this has been linked to a story of a “second modernity” since the 1960s; and 
globalisation has ensured that versions of this story are now very present in developed and 
developing Asian countries. It’s a big story, too big to go into here, but I refer to some broad 
transformations of consumption and markets, usually described as a move from mass to niche 
consumption. 
Session 2 :  TOPIC 4 The Concept of Creative Industries and its Implications for MFEH
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e Mass consumption was linked to Fordism, with its predictable and manageable line of product 
development, production and marketing; niche consumption is post-fordist, with volatile and 
unpredictable markets. This in turn reflects deeper cultural changes―where the individual is 
required not just to follow what everybody else does but to exercise judgement, discernment, 
about what to chose from an ever growing range of products. More, the individual is now seen 
to get their identity not from the group or class but to make this identity, to construct it for 
themselves. This relates to wider transformations in the “welfare state” and conditions of work:
―individuals are now much more responsible for their own life, career, health, education. In the 
west a crucial part of this is the construction of “identity” through the consumption of cultural 
goods―what has been called “the aestheticisation of everyday life.”
The dominating model for this is Maslow’s famous Hierarchy of Needs. This goes from Basic 
Safety Needs―Needs of Love, Affection and Belongingness―Needs for Esteem―Needs for 
Self-Actualization. This relates also to Robert Ingehart’s idea of “post-material values.” These 
powerful cultural currents―called by one “the expressive revolution”―have radically changed the 
nature of western society.
We can see where the economic productivity of artistic creativity comes in―artists are those 
best able to produce for these new markets, to work in its complex and volatile circuits. And they 
are organised within a business sector characterised by “soft skills,” essential to anybody working 
in this difficult business model.
Thus Schumpeterian rule breakers perfectly suited to this market. They are adept in these new 
languages. They move within areas of desire and value in ways unthinkable even a decade ago. 
There are new kinds of jobs my father would not recognise as a job. They aim to satisfy needs 
many people did not even realise were needs. 
There have been many discussions about “bourgeois-bohemians” and how the “counter-
culture” of the 1960s was not about rebellion but simply a new form of consumption developing 
on the margins of society―now become mainstream. Indeed, this is the way a lot of arts funding is 
frequently justified in creative industry policy: as “R&D,” cutting edge, experimental developments 
which will eventually feed into the mainstream as commercial products. In this context is it no 
wonder that many no longer fear the “industrialisation of culture” but the industrialisation of 
everyday life. 
These transformations have very special implications for Asian societies―and especially 
China about which I know more. Innovation and creativity are being promoted across the region 
as the new means by which economies can become competitive―moving away from low-value 
manufacture to more R&D and design intensive goods and services. The “creativity” demanded 
from the new human capital, the “soft skills” which will both create and respond to the new kinds 
of “creative” or post-materialist consumers―these imply a certain kind of social and cultural 
development which many Asian societies have resisted. Sometimes in terms of cultural tradition―
Asian values etc.―sometimes because of more explicit political values―the residual collectivism 
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of Chinese socialism rather than “anarchic” individualism. 
This story of creativity and the “individualisation of identity” as a new source of economic 
growth―limited as it is to the purely economic―involves a set of deeper cultural transformation 
which may or may not be welcome by policy makers or political, social, cultural, religious leaders. 
Note the Chinese separation of cultural and creative industries for one.
Which leads me to the fourth and final story.
Story Four: Creative Industries and Democracy
It is undeniable that what happened in the 1960s in terms of culture had profound impacts on 
the consumption markets and eventually the production economics of the advanced capitalist 
economies.
But I want to tell a different story about this process, and argue that it came from a set of social, 
cultural and political aspirations for democratic change. Where such impulses came from is of 
course a huge question and I only want to highlight a few ideas.
Some suggest the impulse came from a discontent amongst some groups―maybe we can call 
them the “knowledge workers”― with mass society, Fordism, “welfare state capitalism.” In short, 
with the way in which modern bureaucratic capitalism and welfare states were organised and its 
definitions of what constituted “the good life.”
In response to an endless accumulation of material goods they wanted some sense of meaning 
or spiritual purpose. At a more basic level perhaps, rather than seeing work as a step by step rise 
up the ladder they wanted it to be meaningful and satisfying. 
At a more general level they suggested that ones social role should not be given by “society” 
but created by the individual. Rather than “doing ones duty” being the true form of life ones real 
duty was to become an individual, to develop ones own talents, to express oneself, to be―in short 
―creative.
It is clear how these feed into “creative economy” theories and even into Richard Florida’s 
“creative class.” But I think there is a much wider story.
It was in the 1960s that many of these discontents or aspirations became part of “popular 
culture.” Since the later 18th century in Europe part of the mission of “Art” was to criticise the 
materialist market driven world of capitalism as well as the rationalist view of knowledge that went 
with it. Art wanted to “change life” in the French poet Rimbaud’s words. This “artistic critique 
of capitalism” always went side by side with the more material social critique of capitalism. The 
urban cultural movements associated with “cultural industries” formed part of this―a concern with 
new forms of cultural and urban democracy, widening its definition beyond formal mechanisms to 
include new kinds of participation and cultural involvement. 
I would suggest that in the 1980s and 1990s these two concerns―the “artistic” and the “social” 
Session 2 :  TOPIC 4 The Concept of Creative Industries and its Implications for MFEH
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of labour and resulted in a struggle to retain right and living standards. On the other “change life” 
could become associated with “lifestyle” consumption and become uncoupled from any attachment 
to wider politics. Postmodernism might be the name for this. 
But this separation has always been exaggerated, and other tendencies have always tried to put 
these together. This can be found in popular cultures such as “rave,” in ecology movements, in 
anti-globalisation and in the cultural politics of the internet and “creative commons.” 
Consequences for Asian Society
We saw suggested that the “expressive revolution” involved powerful currents of social change. 
Asian societies wanting “creativity” need to know how this is linked to these wider cultural shifts, 
and they might be very wary of it. But it will be difficult to avoid some engagement with this, 
because the “creative workers” on which this sector relies, which are crucial to the idea of the 
creative industries, are deeply reliant on these cultural shifts. 
The new cultural entrepreneurs who are the heroes of creativity also came out of this 
transformation of culture and society. They too wanted to break with the 9-5; to have meaningful 
work not just work for wages; to make artistic or creative products; to change life. The new 
creative entrepreneurs who are central to the productive force of the creative industries were 
also involved in these cultural transformations.
They did not look to government subsidy but to the market―but not the kind of mass market 
of mainstream products but small, niche, often local, markets. They had to make money, but also 
wanted to make meaning; they wanted work but on particular terms. Unlike others they did not 
maximize growth but looked to develop organically in line with their ideals and aspirations. Many 
of these linked to these wider social, cultural and political aspirations for change.
The business model of the creative industries we discussed above, which relates to the 
production of symbolic or cultural value in new niche and volatile markets remains a very difficult 
business model. But its challenges are not just of a technical character―something to be solved 
a clever person from the Harvard Business School―but reflect deeper socio-cultural tensions, 
dynamics, and conflicts. Some still call this culture versus capitalism; I think this is, at very least, 
too simplistic. It is quite clear that culture is now extremely productive for capitalism. But there 
are within this conflicts, refusals, oppositions and critiques that we have to take account of. 
In Asia, for example, the renegotiation of the individual and society that, in the West, took place 
under the banner of creativity and culture, will take place in very different circumstances. This 
has consequences for CI policy. But it presents all policy with a problem. Creative industries 
generate economic value from cultural value; but this process of turning cultural into economic 
value is extremely complex and goes through many circuitous routes which are unpredictable and 
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not easily managed. Indeed, some parts of this circuit are actively opposed to the attempts to turn 
it into economic policy. 
In this context the exhortations to creativity are rather lame―a much deeper engagement has 
to take place if creative industries are to happen. And this is part of a wider engagement with 
contemporary global modernity and the prospects and dangers it holds for us.
Consequences for Gwangju
The CIs can have positive charge―but they can also be the economic reduction of culture. 
As we saw China is facing real problems with uncoupling the “creative” element from wider 
democratic aspirations―and I mean this is the widest sense of democracy.
Gwangju is a city associated internationally with 18th May events. Rather than just be another 
“creative city” it could be the one that looks towards bottom up grass roots movements; towards 
social solidarity and democracy. How can these values help a city socially and economically 
challenged―this seems to me to be the biggest challenge for the MFEH. It is high risk but it is 
one that would mark it out as utterly unique in Asia. A creative laboratory which links creative 
industries to the widest social, cultural and political creativity as well as merely economic growth.
How? Two important changes have occurred in the last 15 years. First, the rise of the internet 
and the ability of citizens and consumers to feed back into production, to engage in production 
themselves, and to organize themselves and these activities into virtual social networks. The 
implications are not restricted to the impacts on the profitability of the older cultural industries but 
new ways of communication, creation and self-organization. Second, and following from this, is 
the rise of “urban informatics”: cities now produce a vast range of information which is available 
on-line, through mobile, through urban screens and other devices (ubiquitous computing). The 
ability of citizens to actively engage with urban space, political decisions, cultural and communal 
representation is something only just being realized. So too are the skills required to do this.
A new kind of urbanism and a new kind of citizen, a new kind of cultural politics is emerging 
which is trying to assert the grass roots democracy and social solidarity against the consumerist, 
business growth at all (social and cultural) costs model that has dominated in the last two decades 
and has brought cities, countries and the environment into real peril. 
Is not the MFEH a space in which these ideas can be explored, new skills learned, new kinds 
of democracy and social solidarity practices―in a city which gave rise to modern Korean 
Democracy?
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